Curated by Vishaljeet Singh, Lisbon, Portugal
Editorial correction — Sunday, 1 November 2026, 8:40 PM IST: This article previously misdated the Lebanese Cabinet decision as 1 November 2026. The official Lebanese Presidency statement and contemporaneous Reuters reporting identify the emergency Cabinet decision as 2 March 2026. The Cabinet then banned Hezbollah’s military and security activities outside state institutions, required the group to hand over its weapons to the Lebanese state, directed the army to implement the weapons-control plan north of the Litani River, called for an Israeli halt to attacks, and expressed readiness to resume negotiations with civilian participation and international sponsorship. This was a Lebanese state decision; it did not establish that Hezbollah accepted disarmament or transferred weapons. The separate Reuters report of 10 April 2025 described a conditional position attributed to an unnamed Hezbollah official and later disputed by Hezbollah’s media office; it was not a confirmed organisational agreement.
According to the Lebanese Presidency’s official account of the emergency Cabinet meeting on 2 March 2026, the government declared Hezbollah’s military and security activities outside state institutions unlawful, ordered the group to hand over its weapons to the state and limited its role to political activity within constitutional and legal frameworks. It directed military and security agencies to prevent military operations and rocket or drone launches from Lebanese territory, and asked the army to implement the weapons-control plan north of the Litani River. The Cabinet also called on guarantor states to secure an Israeli commitment to halt attacks and said Lebanon was ready to resume negotiations with civilian participation and international sponsorship. These are government decisions and instructions; they do not establish that Hezbollah has accepted them or that implementation has been completed.
The 2 March 2026 Cabinet decision does not show that Hezbollah has accepted disarmament or entered new talks. It sets out the Lebanese state’s position and assigns the army an implementation role, while the government also seeks an Israeli halt to attacks and a renewed negotiation process. No verified transfer of Hezbollah weapons to the Lebanese state is established by the statement.
For President Joseph Aoun, the challenge is to implement the Cabinet’s weapons-control decision while avoiding an internal confrontation, securing support for the Lebanese Armed Forces and pressing for an end to Israeli attacks.
What the 2025 Reuters report said
In a Reuters report published on 10 April 2025, an unnamed senior Hezbollah official said the group was prepared to discuss its weapons within a national defence strategy if Israel withdrew from five hilltop positions in southern Lebanon and stopped its strikes. This was an attributed, conditional statement from 2025—not a new announcement on 1 November 2026 and not a formal disarmament agreement.
The official said the discussions could take place within the framework of a national defence strategy.
This distinction is important. Hezbollah has not announced that it will immediately hand over its entire arsenal to the Lebanese army. Its reported position instead leaves open the possibility of negotiating how its weapons might be addressed as part of a broader security arrangement.
After the 2025 report was published, Hezbollah’s media office issued a statement saying allegations published in some media outlets and attributed to Hezbollah officials were “completely false”. The statement did not name Reuters or specify which allegations it meant. The Lebanese presidency declined to comment. The reported offer was therefore contested at the time and should not be presented as a confirmed organisational commitment.
Why the five Israeli positions matter
Israel withdrew most of its ground forces from southern Lebanon following the 2024 conflict, but it decided not to leave five strategic positions overlooking areas near the border.
Israel has argued that maintaining these positions is necessary to prevent Hezbollah from rebuilding military infrastructure and threatening communities in northern Israel. It has indicated that the positions could eventually be handed over to Lebanese forces when the security situation allows.
Lebanon considers the continued presence of Israeli troops on its territory a violation of its sovereignty. For Beirut, withdrawal is not merely a military demand. It is central to restoring the authority of the Lebanese state and demonstrating that national territory cannot remain under foreign military control indefinitely.
For Israel, however, leaving without confidence that Hezbollah’s military infrastructure will be dismantled could be viewed as creating new security risks.
The 2025 Reuters report attributed to a senior official a condition that Israel withdraw from five positions before discussions about weapons. Israel has separately argued that it needs credible security guarantees before completing its withdrawal. The Lebanese Cabinet’s 2 March 2026 statement called for an Israeli halt to attacks and renewed negotiations, but it did not settle the sequence of withdrawal and weapons control or confirm Hezbollah’s participation.
President Joseph Aoun’s effort to restore state authority
President Joseph Aoun has made the establishment of state control over weapons a central objective of his presidency. A former commander of the Lebanese Armed Forces, Aoun understands the institutional and security challenges involved in confronting a powerful armed organisation that also has political representation and a substantial support base.
His approach has emphasised dialogue rather than forcibly disarming Hezbollah. That strategy reflects Lebanon’s fragile political structure. The country operates through a sectarian power-sharing system, and any attempt to dismantle Hezbollah’s military organisation through force could create a dangerous confrontation within Lebanese society.
Aoun has argued that the state must gradually strengthen its authority and that the question of weapons should be addressed through political and national mechanisms.
The president’s challenge is to convince Hezbollah that its security concerns can be addressed through state institutions while persuading Israel and international partners that Lebanon can take responsibility for border security.
The security framework and the role of Washington
The current dispute is connected to a US-backed security framework linking Hezbollah’s disarmament with a gradual Israeli military withdrawal and an expanded role for the Lebanese Armed Forces. It is intended to move towards a situation in which the Lebanese state exercises effective authority over its territory and unauthorised military infrastructure is dismantled.
However, implementation has been difficult. Lebanon argues that continued Israeli strikes and the occupation of positions in the south undermine the government’s ability to persuade Hezbollah to surrender its weapons.
Israel, meanwhile, argues that the Lebanese army has not yet demonstrated that it can prevent Hezbollah from rebuilding military capabilities or threatening Israeli communities.
Washington therefore faces a complicated diplomatic task. It must encourage Israel to fulfil its withdrawal commitments while pressing Lebanon to make measurable progress on the weapons issue. The United States remains Israel’s principal international ally and an important supporter of the Lebanese military and state institutions.
Hezbollah’s weakened military position
The conditional willingness attributed to a senior Hezbollah official in the April 2025 Reuters report must be understood against the group’s changed military position after the 2024 war with Israel. That report remains historical background and was later disputed by Hezbollah’s media office.
The 2024 war with Israel inflicted serious losses on the organisation. Several senior commanders and other leading figures were killed, thousands of fighters were lost, and much of its rocket and military infrastructure was damaged or destroyed. The fall of Bashar al-Assad in Syria further complicated Hezbollah’s regional position by disrupting an important route through which Iran had supported the organisation.
The group remains a significant political and armed actor, but the regional environment in which it previously operated has changed substantially.
Reuters reported on 26 October 2026, citing Lebanese security sources, that Hezbollah had spent about three months preparing for a possible renewed conflict with Israel. The sources described efforts to replenish weapons, produce attack drones and rebuild parts of the group’s command structure, alongside military funding from Iran. These are claims attributed to the sources cited by Reuters; they are not an official public confirmation by Hezbollah or proof that a new war is inevitable. The report shows that diplomatic discussions and reported military preparations can be occurring at the same time.
What the 2025 report said about possible weapons transfers
One of the most important questions is whether discussions could begin with selected categories of weapons rather than requiring the immediate surrender of the entire arsenal.
The April 2025 Reuters report also cited two anonymous sources familiar with Hezbollah’s thinking as saying the group was weighing the transfer of some potent weapons north of the Litani River, including drones and anti-tank missiles. Those claims were not a public commitment by Hezbollah and should be treated as attributed reporting, particularly in light of the subsequent denial from its media office.
The Litani River has long been central to security arrangements in southern Lebanon. The ceasefire framework requires the Lebanese army to dismantle unauthorised military facilities and confiscate weapons, beginning in areas south of the river.
A phased process could potentially allow the Lebanese state to expand its presence while avoiding an immediate confrontation with Hezbollah. However, implementation would require agreement on verification, timelines, the handling of weapons and the responsibilities of the Lebanese army. It would also require confidence that Israel would fulfil its own commitments.
Why forced disarmament could destabilise Lebanon
Hezbollah is not simply an armed organisation operating outside the political system. It has a substantial political constituency, parliamentary representation and a wider network of supporters and institutions.
Its weapons have long been defended by the organisation as a deterrent against Israel. Critics inside Lebanon argue that maintaining an independent military structure undermines national sovereignty and allows Hezbollah to make decisions about war and peace without the authority of the state.
These competing positions have created deep divisions. Lebanon’s history provides a warning about the dangers of trying to resolve such disputes through force. The country experienced a devastating civil war between 1975 and 1990, while armed clashes in 2008 demonstrated how quickly political disagreements involving Hezbollah could escalate into domestic violence.
For Aoun, a negotiated process is therefore not simply a diplomatic preference. It is also a way of reducing the risk of internal conflict.
The Lebanese army faces a major test
The Lebanese Armed Forces will be central to any future arrangement. The government wants the army to expand its presence across the country, secure the southern border and assume responsibilities currently contested by Hezbollah and Israel.
But the military faces resource constraints and a difficult political environment. Taking control of territory does not automatically mean it can independently manage every security challenge.
The army would need adequate funding, equipment, intelligence capabilities, logistical support and political backing. It would also need a clear mandate to deal with unauthorised military infrastructure without being drawn into an internal confrontation.
International support will therefore be essential. The credibility of any disarmament agreement will depend partly on whether the Lebanese army can demonstrate that it is capable of protecting the country’s territory and population.
UNIFIL’s future adds urgency
United Nations Security Council Resolution 2790 (2025) extended UNIFIL’s mandate for a final time until 31 December 2026. It directs the mission to cease operations on that date and begin an orderly and safe drawdown and withdrawal from that date over a period of up to one year, in close consultation with the Lebanese government. The resolution does not mean that all UNIFIL personnel leave immediately on 31 December 2026.
The force has played an important role in monitoring the Blue Line, maintaining liaison between the Lebanese and Israeli sides and helping reduce the risk of accidental escalation.
Its departure could create additional pressure on Lebanon to strengthen its own security institutions. President Aoun has expressed concern about the possibility of a security vacuum in southern Lebanon and has sought international support for arrangements that could preserve monitoring and coordination after UNIFIL’s mandate ends.
Iran’s influence and the wider regional dimension
Hezbollah’s relationship with Iran adds another layer to the negotiations. Iran has provided the organisation with political, financial and military support over many years. Hezbollah has also been one of the most important components of Tehran’s regional network of allied armed groups.
Any substantial reduction in Hezbollah’s military capabilities would therefore have implications beyond Lebanon. It could affect Iran’s regional influence and alter the balance of power along Israel’s northern frontier.
At the same time, the wider confrontation involving Iran, Israel and the United States increases the risk that Lebanon could again become a battlefield. For the Lebanese government, preventing the country from being drawn into another regional conflict is an urgent national priority.
For Israel, the central concern remains preventing Hezbollah from rebuilding the capabilities that previously enabled it to threaten northern communities. The United States will need to balance these competing security concerns if it wants the current framework to produce lasting results.
What happens next?
- March 2026 Cabinet decision: Whether the army can implement the 2 March plan to bring weapons under state control north of the Litani River.
- Hezbollah’s response: Whether the organisation complies or enters a formal process; no public acceptance or verified weapons transfer has been established.
- Israeli actions: Whether Israel halts attacks and takes steps that reduce border tensions.
- US diplomatic role: Whether Washington can secure reciprocal commitments and support a workable security arrangement.
- Lebanese army capacity: Whether the military receives the funding, equipment and political backing needed to assume greater responsibility.
- UNIFIL transition: Preparations for the mission to cease operations on 31 December 2026 and begin its drawdown and withdrawal over up to one year.
The central question is whether both sides can accept that security arrangements must involve reciprocal obligations rather than placing the entire burden on one party.
A disputed 2025 report and the March 2026 Cabinet decision
The April 2025 Reuters report described a conditional position attributed to an unnamed senior official, but Hezbollah’s media office later disputed allegations attributed to its officials. The report did not establish a formal agreement to disarm and was not a new offer on 1 November 2026.
The verified Lebanese government decision discussed here was issued on 2 March 2026, not 1 November 2026. The Lebanese Presidency’s official account records the ban on Hezbollah’s military and security activities outside state institutions, the weapons handover order, the army implementation directive and the call for renewed negotiations. As of 1 November 2026, the latest additional development identified in this review was Reuters’ 26 October report, based on Lebanese security sources, that Hezbollah had been preparing for a possible renewed confrontation; these remain attributed source claims, not an official Hezbollah announcement. No separate 1 November Cabinet decision on this issue was identified in the official sources checked. Implementation of the March decision, Hezbollah’s response and any Israeli commitment to halt attacks remain unresolved.
President Joseph Aoun is attempting to navigate between these competing demands while strengthening the Lebanese state and avoiding another domestic conflict.
The coming weeks could determine whether Lebanon moves towards a negotiated security arrangement or remains trapped in a cycle of military pressure, political confrontation and uncertainty.
For Lebanon, the stakes extend beyond the future of Hezbollah. They concern the country’s sovereignty, the authority of its institutions and the ability of its people to avoid another devastating war.
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