Curated by KS Randhawa, New Delhi
India’s future military strength may depend as much on satellites, secure data networks and navigation systems as on fighter jets, missiles and warships. Chief of Defence Staff General N. S. Raja Subramani has warned that dependence on externally controlled satellite services could create serious vulnerabilities during a conflict.
Speaking at the ANI National Security Summit 3.0 in New Delhi on 16 November, the CDS highlighted disruptions to Starlink connectivity during the Ukraine war and called for stronger indigenous space capabilities. His warning raises an important question: can India independently maintain critical military communications, surveillance and navigation if foreign services become unavailable during a crisis?
What exactly did the CDS say?
General Raja Subramani described space as an increasingly contested domain of modern warfare. Military operations now rely heavily on satellite-based intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, communications, precision navigation and timing. These capabilities help commanders understand battlefield developments, coordinate forces and operate sophisticated equipment.
The CDS warned that adversaries could attempt to deny India access to essential space services. He emphasized developing reliable domestic capabilities through the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO), commercial companies and India’s wider technology ecosystem. His remarks are a strategic recommendation for self-reliance, not confirmation of a newly approved military broadband constellation with a budget or launch schedule.
The Ukraine–Starlink lesson
The Russia–Ukraine conflict has demonstrated the importance of commercial satellite communications in modern warfare. Satellite broadband can connect military units, support communications where terrestrial infrastructure is damaged and provide connectivity for certain remotely operated systems.
General Raja Subramani cited instances of Starlink service denial or degradation affecting the effectiveness of Ukrainian long-range drones. The lesson is not that commercial technology has no military value; it is that critical operational dependence creates risk when an outside organization controls access.
Connectivity can be affected by technical failures, electronic interference, cyberattacks, geographic restrictions or service-provider decisions. India’s military planners therefore need alternatives, redundancy and independent control over essential systems.
Does India need its own Starlink?
Starlink is primarily a large low-Earth-orbit satellite network providing broadband connectivity. India’s defence requirements are broader. A comprehensive military space architecture must support secure communications, observation, navigation, timing and coordination across the Army, Navy and Air Force.
Its essential capabilities include secure communications between forces; surveillance of land and maritime activity; independent positioning and guidance; precise timing for synchronized systems; and resilience when individual links or satellites are disrupted.
A sovereign military network would require more than satellites alone: secure ground stations, terminals, cybersecurity, spectrum coordination, domestic maintenance and dependable launch capability. The objective need not be to replicate Starlink’s commercial scale, but to deliver the coverage and resilience the armed forces actually require.
NavIC: India’s existing navigation capability
India already operates an indigenous regional satellite navigation system, Navigation with Indian Constellation, or NavIC. Developed by ISRO, it is designed to provide positioning, navigation and timing services across India and surrounding regions.
NavIC offers a standard service for civilian users and a restricted service for authorized strategic users. Reliable navigation and timing can support aircraft, ships, communications networks and defence applications. However, NavIC is not a broadband communications system and cannot be treated as a direct substitute for satellite internet.
SBS-3: India’s surveillance programme
Another important component is Space-Based Surveillance-3, or SBS-3, intended to expand India’s ability to observe land and maritime activity from orbit. Reports concerning a 2024 Cabinet Committee on Security approval described a programme of 52 surveillance satellites with an estimated cost of approximately ₹26,968 crore, involving 21 satellites associated with ISRO and 31 with private industry.
These reported figures relate to SBS-3 surveillance, not a newly announced Starlink-style military broadband system. The CDS said the surveillance programme would significantly improve capabilities once deployed, while emphasizing that further development remains necessary.
Three distinct functions: NavIC provides navigation and timing; SBS-3 is intended for surveillance and intelligence; military satellite broadband would provide secure communications and data connectivity. The systems complement one another but are not interchangeable.
Why ISRO and private companies both matter
ISRO brings decades of experience in satellite design, launch operations and space infrastructure. India’s private space industry is developing capabilities in satellite manufacturing, launch systems, communications equipment, software and ground infrastructure.
A resilient military architecture could benefit from both. Government institutions can establish operational requirements and security standards, while companies contribute production capacity and specialized technology. The CDS also emphasized domestic control over intellectual property and critical components. Assembling equipment in India does not guarantee independence if essential software or operating permissions remain externally controlled.
What would an indigenous network cost?
There is no confirmed public budget for a newly approved Indian military equivalent of Starlink arising from these remarks. Any meaningful estimate depends on whether the architecture uses low-Earth-orbit, geostationary or hybrid satellites; the number of satellites; secure terminals and ground stations; launches and replacements; anti-jamming systems; and whether infrastructure is dedicated to military use.
It would be misleading to assign the reported SBS-3 budget of ₹26,968 crore to an unannounced military broadband project.
Security risks: Why domestic ownership is not enough
Indigenous systems can reduce some dependencies, but they are not automatically immune to disruption. Satellites and supporting networks face electronic interference, cyberattacks, ground-infrastructure failures and physical threats.
A dependable architecture needs redundant communication routes, secure encryption, independent navigation options, protected ground infrastructure and contingency procedures. The ability to repair, replace and replenish equipment during prolonged conflict is equally important.
What can India realistically achieve?
India does not need to begin from zero. It already has satellite-navigation experience, launch capability, military communications infrastructure and a growing private space sector. The harder task is integrating these capabilities into a resilient operational network.
That requires coordination among defence users, ISRO, the Defence Space Agency, research organizations and manufacturers. A phased approach would strengthen existing systems, identify capability gaps, test technologies and expand where operational requirements justify investment. Specific deadlines or satellite counts should not be announced without official confirmation.
What this means for India’s borders and the Indian Ocean
India’s security requirements span difficult Himalayan terrain, extensive land borders and a vast maritime area. Satellite communications can support remote regions where terrestrial networks are limited. Space-based surveillance can help monitor land and sea activity, while independent navigation and timing can reduce reliance on foreign systems.
These capabilities can strengthen situational awareness and operational continuity, but satellites are only one part of defence preparedness. Effective use also depends on trained personnel, secure ground equipment and reliable decision-making.
The bigger message: Strategic independence
General Raja Subramani’s warning reflects a broader change in warfare. Military effectiveness increasingly depends on software, data, communications, manufacturing capacity and the ability to maintain systems under pressure.
Strategic independence does not require rejecting foreign technology or international partnerships. It means retaining sufficient control over critical capabilities so that national-security decisions are not constrained by avoidable external dependencies.
The objective is not simply to build an Indian Starlink. It is to ensure that India’s armed forces can communicate, navigate and operate reliably when those capabilities matter most.
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